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ABSTRACT: 
In this article, I present the three forms of proletarianization found in Stiegler’s work: the 
proletarianization of the producer, the proletarianization of the consumer, and generalized 
proletarianization. In the lectures included in this issue, Stiegler refers to the proletarianization of 
sensibility, which belongs to this last form of proletarianization. I attempt to contextualize this 
new work in relation to Stiegler’s past work on political economy as well as some of his political 
positions about capitalism as a social organization. I explain where the notion of proletarianization 
gets muddled and I also compare his position on new forms of capitalism to the influential work of 
André Gorz. Following Stiegler, I will call the underlying political project of deproletarianization 
that he has developed “protentional politics.” I turn more specifically to the under-discussed 
notion of “tertiary protention” and questions its place in Stiegler’s thought. Finally, I also explain 
why Stiegler’s turn to the figure of the amateur, especially in the third lecture in this issue, is 
strategic in thinking of deproletarianizing practices. However, it is hardly straightforward since the 
role of the amateur has evolved dramatically throughout the last three hundred years. 
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The proletariat is recruited from all classes of the population.i  
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels 
 
But I quote Marx without saying so, without quotation marks, and because people are 
incapable of recognizing Marx’s texts I am thought to be someone who doesn’t quote 
Marx. When a physicist writes a work of physics, does he feel it necessary to quote 
Newton and Einstein? He uses them, but he doesn’t need the quotation marks, the footnote 
and the eulogistic comment to prove how completely he is being faithful to the master’s 
thought. And because other physicists know what Einstein did, what he discovered and 
proved, they can recognize him in what the physicist writes.ii 
Michel Foucault 
 
We no longer have an image of the proletarian that we would simply need to be conscious 
of.iii 
Gilles Deleuze 
 
 
In the hyperindustrial world, in which life is spent more in front of the computer than in the 
factory, the notion of the proletariat seems obsolete. However, following the statement made in 
the 1970s by Foucault in the second epigraph to this article, Marx and Engels arguably defined 
axioms to understand society and economic relations that continue to be relevant for political 
philosophy today, even after the financialization of the economy and the economic crisis. While 
Marx and Engels presented in some ways the laws of political economy, to do a new critique of 
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political economy would mean, according to Bernard Stiegler, to combat capitalism’s 
proletarianizing tendency to turn all things into a hypercalculable environment in which 
singularities and desire disappear. Stiegler’s philosophy thus clearly inherits the Marxist 
framework and axioms, while also displacing the notion of the proletariat into a larger notion: 
proletarianization. By this, Stiegler refers, first of all, to a condition rather than a specific class 
(the workers); second, the term is not defined by the absence of ownership over the means of 
production but by a loss of knowledge. 
 In this article, I present the three forms of proletarianization found in Stiegler’s work: the 
proletarianization of the producer, the proletarianization of the consumer, and generalized 
proletarianization. In the lectures included in this issue, Stiegler refers to the proletarianization of 
sensibility, which belongs to this last form of proletarianization. My article is an attempt to 
contextualize this new work in relation to Stiegler’s past work on political economy as well as 
some of his political positions about capitalism as a social organization. Following Stiegler, I will 
call the underlying political project of deproletarianization that he has developed “protentional 
politics.” Finally, I also explain why Stiegler’s turn to the figure of the amateur, especially in the 
third lecture in this issue, is strategic in thinking of deproletarianizing practices. However, it is 
hardly straightforward since the role of the amateur has evolved dramatically throughout the last 
three hundred years. In this sense, the amateur is the enacting, and even the acting out, of 
protentional politics. Stiegler attempts to bring a new, positive meaning to the “amateur” by going 
back to the etymology of the word (amator, the person who loves) for political purposes; the 
amateur is the new “image of the proletarian,” as an emancipatory and not negative figure. 
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What is proletarianization?  
 
Proletarianization is not a new theme in Stiegler’s work. While it arguably begins with his 
interpretation of Simondon’s “mecanology” in Technics and Time 1, its actual first appearance is 
in Technics and Time 2 in the discussion of the loss of individuation in Simondon’s reading of 
Marx.iv While Simondon does not always refer to Marx’s texts, in Of Modes of Existence of 
Technical Objects (1958) he developed an original reading of Marx’s arguments about the 
consequences of the use of machinery for the worker in the mode of production.v For Simondon, 
alienation is not identity or class-based but conditioned by the human-machine relation. This 
means that the wealthy are also alienated from the point of view of the technical object.vi Stiegler 
extends Simondon’s argument, however, by referring in this context to the loss of knowledge in 
general. While Simondon was thus concerned about the relation of the individual with the world 
through the technical object, Stiegler’s interest is larger and serves as a basis for his new critique 
of political economy. Simondon argued that progress cannot be reduced to the economic realm but 
should be rethought ontologically from the point of view of technical objects: 
 
It is not because a civilization loves money that it is attached to efficiency, but because it is 
first a civilization of efficiency that it becomes a civilization of money […] In spite of the 
civil liberties, [this civilization of money] is burdensome for individuals.vii 
 
There is a passion for the efficiency and progress of technical objects that surpasses the economic 
and capitalist framework. Two interpretations can follow from this short passage. First of all, as an 
idealism that forgets that in a capitalist mode of production, exchange value overdetermines use 
value, and it is difficult to imagine the production of the technical object outside capitalism. 
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Second, Simondon’s theory is prophetic in thinking the invention of technical objects beyond the 
logic of employment (understood as remunerated work), organized by capitalism. The latter 
interpretation calls for a more radical reading of Simondon, which resonates with Stiegler’s 
conception of deproletarianization and Gorz’s philosophy of work, both of which I discuss at the 
end of this article. 
 In reading Marx’s Grundrisse, especially his “Fragments on Machines,” Simondon argued 
that with the machine-tool, the worker was deprived from his know-how (savoir-faire) and was 
reduced to a mere technical organ of the machine. He called this condition, “a loss of 
individuation.”viii This understanding of the loss of individuation was introduced in Stiegler’s own 
terms as disorientation and as ill-being (mal-être), in Technics and Time 2 and Technics and Time 
3. However, Stiegler’s most systematic transformation and definition of proletarianization is 
developed in the second part of his work, starting with the Symbolic Misery and Disbelief and 
Discredit series until his most recent book Pharmacology of National Front. Throughout his work, 
Stiegler develops a systematic understanding of proletarianization, making this concept extremely 
relevant to diagnose and analyze the elements of contemporary capitalism (financialization, the 
role of debt, the end of the welfare state, the restrictions of the right to strike and protest, mass 
unemployment, ecological problems and the privatization of all forms of life) but I also point out 
where Stiegler blurs the precision of the concept. 
 The first dimension of proletarianization that must be considered is the proletarianization of 
the producer. This draws directly from Marx’s “Fragments on Machines:” 
 
Not as with the instrument, which the worker animates and makes into his organ with his 
skill and strength, and whose handling therefore depends on his virtuosity. Rather, it is the 
machine which possesses skill and strength in place of the worker, is itself the virtuoso, with 
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a soul of its own in the mechanical laws acting through it … The worker’s activity, reduced 
to a mere abstraction of activity, is determined and regulated to a mere abstraction of 
activity, is determined and regulated on all sides by the movement of the machinery, and not 
the opposite.ix 
 
The worker’s knowledge has been inscribed in the machine, and he is reduced to an activity of 
monitoring and assisting the machine rather than working with raw materials. By relying on the 
machine, the knowledge of the worker is transferred into the machine. Stiegler calls this process 
proletarianization: through this loss of knowledge, the worker is proletarianized. What interests 
Stiegler is less the reification of labor into the machine or the theory of abstract labor and how 
these play out within Marxist philosophy from Lukács onwards, but how to reconfigure the social 
in accounting for the loss of knowledge. In this sense, when a worker is proletarianized, he is 
deprived of his capacity to elevate himself above his condition and to individuate with others 
(through the process of co-individuation) and with technical objects – for Stiegler, there is no 
distinction between work and individuation in this sense. 
 As a reader of Roman law, Marx used the term proletariat in reference to the Latin term, 
proletarianus, denoting the person who has no property or no wealth. In Latin, “proles” means 
offspring, which seems to imply that the proletarian is a child, a descendant of the owner or the 
state. The displacement operated by Stiegler with his notion of proletarianization is faithful to this 
Latin etymology: a person without wealth – if we understand “wealth” in the sense André Gorz 
and Dominique Méda have given to this term. For Gorz and Méda, wealth is not reducible to 
accumulated capital, but refers to being in a position to cultivate and work at one’s individual and 
social patrimony.x Stiegler’s task is to diagnose historically the symptoms of proletarianization, 
rather than holding on to the proletarians as a class in charge of its own history.  
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 While in this article I intend to show the power and the operability of proletarianization as 
“a new image of the proletariat,” it is worth noting, first of all, that the absence of discussions on 
the theme of alienation in Marxist literature in Stiegler’s texts makes the new category of 
proletarianization significantly more difficult to appreciate. Where does alienation end and 
proletarianization begin? Marx inherited the theme of alienation from Hegel, who uses it to refer 
to the separation of the human spirit from nature. Alienation is overcome when spirit is fully 
developed and finds itself at home in the world. For Marx however, alienation is related to work 
(“alienated work,” in the words of the 1844 Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts), referring 
to a psychological and physical separation of the worker from his nature and the world; however, 
it is also historically determined and constitutes a necessary stage to self-realization. In this latter 
sense, it is accepted as a stage of human development. The individual is transformed into 
“commodity-man.” Dialectically, however, this negativity is also the condition for a higher stage 
of human civilization.xi  
 This indicative picture of Marx’s dialectical movement does not correspond exactly to 
Stiegler’s pharmacology, even though Stiegler finds pharmacological elements in some of Marx’s 
texts (especially his analyses of machinery and the means of production). One of the differences, 
for example, between Marx and Stiegler is that while alienation is primarily concerned with the 
repression and the diminution of psychological and physiological capacities, Stiegler’s notion of 
proletarianization is used to diagnose the level of both theoretical and practical knowledges in 
society. 
 The theme of alienation is often linked to the first and second stages of capitalism, from 
the first industrial revolution and the birth of the factory to the rise of Fordism. However, as such 
it gives a necessary historical basis to describe the new forms of proletarianization that appeared 
with post-Fordism, the third phase of capitalism. The different stages of capitalism are 
fundamental to portray the move from the proletarianization of the producer to the 
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proletarianization of the consumer, but they are also technically determined, through what Stiegler 
calls stages of grammatization. Grammatization is best defined as a technical history of memory: 
the material and therefore spatial existence (or engraming) of a temporal flow.xii The process of 
grammatization explains how technical objects come to be, not only as the support of knowledge 
(logos), but as its inscription, its discretion and therefore its modification. Techno-logy is thus not 
the discourse about technics but the formalization and the transformation of knowledge; the 
technical tool grammatizes gestures, speeches, sensibilities, and knowledges in general.xiii 
Grammatization is more general than proletarianization, which only accounts for the loss of 
knowledge. In this sense, we can say that grammatization conditions proletarianization. Both 
grammatization and proletarianization are historically determined. 
 Stiegler refers in this context to three industrial revolutions: The first, which was at the 
center of Marx’s analysis of capitalism, took place in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries with 
the invention of the steam engine and mechanized production but also the first railway networks. 
The second is the development of Taylorism-Fordism as a new form of capitalism based primarily 
on oil, the car industry and consumption. The third is the financialization of society and debt, the 
rise of the information economy, and what some call “cognitive capitalism.”  
 In the second industrial revolution the rise of the consumer was organized by giving 
workers higher wages and better social conditions. This also coincided with the birth of the 
welfare state that systematically stimulated consumption by taking care of the population with 
health and unemployment benefits. Bruno Trentin demonstrates the correlation between 
Keynesian measures and the development of Fordism, what Stiegler calls the “Fordist 
compromise” (PFN 325). He argued in 1997 that the left did not see the mutation of the these 
industrial models after 1970: 
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We should in fact situate the beginning of this crisis during the phase that coincided with the 
exhaustion of the first thirty years of almost continuous growth of production and revenues 
in industrialized countries (what the French call Les Trentes Glorieuses) and with the 
emergence of limits to the Fordist model and the Taylorist forms of labor organization, at 
the moment of the arrival of new flexible technologies of information and the accelerated 
process of the globalized markets.xiv 
 
The third industrial revolution is portrayed as the passage “from the motorway network to the 
digital network,”xv the information economy and the rise of new technologies. This transition, as 
Trentin demonstrates, is what the left did not think and continues to refuse to think when it is 
calling for “more purchasing power” instead of struggling against proletarianization itself (EC 
231). For Stiegler, the slogan of “increasing people’s purchasing power” belongs to the populist 
discourse that comforts the second industrial model, no longer relevant in a service-based 
economy and “cultural capitalism,” since this old model is in fact already overcome. Politicians 
should be calling instead for an increase of “purchasing knowledge” (PFN 331). 
 In pointing out the “Fordist compromise,” Stiegler does not target the welfare state as such 
since it has been continuously under attack from the 1970s onwards. Instead, he attempts to 
reformulate the political question in terms of consumerism and even “hyperconsumption”. “The 
consumer is the new proletarian figure, and the proletariat, very far from disappearing, has become 
a condition – proletarianization – from which it has become nearly impossible to escape.”xvi 
Demanding more purchasing power implies for Stiegler to demand, instead of reconsidering the 
value of work and work as value, more proletarianization and the impoverishment of the 
consumer, an impoverishment of both her savoir-faire (know-how) and savoir-vivre (knowing-
how-to-live).xvii With hyperconsumption, individuals have become addicted to consumption.xviii 
Capitalism has ceased to be a “destructive creation” as Schumpeter famously argued, but has been 
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turned into a “destructive destruction,” and this is due to the acceleration of technical novelty. 
Technical novelty has required a social readjustment as Bertrand Gille demonstrated, but today the 
threat of the obsolescence of forms of life has increased with such extreme intensity that it is 
philosophy’s role to slow down technical life and diagnose the threats and the hopes of these 
obsolescences.  
 Today, these forms of life (the family structure, social institutions such as universities or 
schools, but also associations and organizations) do not simply become obsolete but are 
interrupted, short-circuited and evermore shuffled, and the obsolescences of technologies are not 
organized technically but planned economically – hence the expression: “planned obsolescence.” 
This is what Stiegler means by the proletarianization of savoir-vivre: 
 
In the most general way [hyperconsumption] deprives consumers of their savoir-vivre, 
forcing them to constantly try to keep up with the obsolescence of things. This is so because 
the milieu has become fundamentally unfaithful, but according to a rhythm that no longer 
permits the production of new forms of fidelity, or of pathos producer of philia, or of trust, 
and it is the result of a much larger process that, as “absolute pharmakon”, thereby deprives 
political leaders of the very possibility of making decisions and deprives scientists of the 
capacity to theorize their practice, that is, to form long circuits.xix  
 
This planned obsolescence leads to a situation in which computers or mobile phones are meant to 
last two years, fridges five years, and so on, to stimulate consumption. It is partly this constant 
change in pharmaka that leads to a situation of generalised frustration, not only with the 
production of new needs and the destruction of desire, but by the economic demands to adapt 
constantly to new pharmaka, and to render impossible the processes of adoption. The distinction 
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between adaptation and adoption has been at the heart of Stiegler’s political philosophy since 
Technics and Time 3: The Time of Cinema. The capitalist system demands constant adaptation to a 
changing environment not by having its subjects participate in this change but by having them 
passively (and tacitly) adapt to it. Adaptation is one of the primary targets of Stiegler’s new 
Ideologiekritik and it is combatted by inventing wild and creative forms of adoptions – and not 
merely by resisting the adaptive prerogatives.xx 
 This shift from the proletarianization of the producer as Marx diagnosed it in Grundrisse to 
the proletarianization of the consumer, as first described and critiqued by Guy Debord and Jean 
Baudrillard in 1967-1970, has an evident consequence.xxi Consumption in a hyperindustrial and 
service-based economy has replaced production: consumption is the continuation of production by 
other means. With the development of new means of communication (mobile, internet) and new 
technologies (robots and automata of all kinds), the time of the consumer is increasingly spent on 
performing tasks that workers used to do: self-checkouts, cashpoints and online ticket reservations 
are the best examples of this paradigm. 
 While the victim of the first form of proletarianization was the producer, especially the 
industrial worker, the second form of proletarianization mainly has affected the consumer, 
especially those members of the middle-class who had access to more and more retail areas (the 
department store and the supermarket, then the shopping center and the online retailer). 
Generalized proletarianization, the third form of proletarianization, is then logically defined by its 
mass propagation. It can be associated with the third industrial revolution (post-Fordism), even 
though there is no radical break; rather, there are hybrid forms of proletarianization during the 
second half of the twentieth century, with generalized proletarianization being the intensification 
of the previous two forms of proletarianization (of the producer and the consumer) (DD1 62-63).  
 As I noted earlier, the consumer is the new proletarian, but when Stiegler advances this 
statement, he is careful to point out that this is a condition no one can escape. In this sense, the 
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proletarianization of the consumer is always already a generalized proletarianization, but the 
distinction is nonetheless significant in understanding the degrees in the intensification of 
proletarianization. What Adorno and Horkheimer diagnosed in 1944 as the “culture industry” 
anticipated in this respect the generalization of proletarianization. With the culture industry, 
“sustained thought is out of the question”: it “leaves no room for imagination or reflection on the 
part of the audience.” Instead, spectators are expected to “react automatically.”xxii Adorno and 
Horkheimer anticipated this since they theorized the film industry as having a totalizing power 
over the real life of individuals. With new communication networks, using both analog and digital 
technologies, information has become a commodity that is transferrable via cables and satellites to 
organize systematically the synchronization of consciousnesses. Generalized proletarianization for 
Stiegler is defined by the combined loss of savoir-faire, savoir-vivre and savoir-théoriser 
(theoretical knowledge), reducing the consumer’s existence to a subsistence by liquidating her 
singularities.xxiii It is only from there that it will be become clear why Stiegler considers the 
amateur, that is everyone, to be a the revolutionary agent. 
 Due to the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, marketing has been used increasingly to 
compensate for the lack of use value of new commodities, by stimulating the drives of the 
consumers and by first targeting the vulnerability of children who have not fully developed their 
capacity to transform their drives into desires.xxiv Marketing strategies are operated through social 
media, mass media and Hollywood, and these knowledge and information industries have turned 
consciousnesses into “raw materials” (MS 36). While in the second industrial revolution, goods 
were exchanged and consumed – they were “circulating capital,” as defined by Marx –, with the 
third industrial revolution what is sold has no intrinsic value and the targets are not individuals but 
consciousnesses (“consciousnesses are markets”, MS 36). This leads Stiegler to define the present 
economic system as a drive-based capitalism that exploits all forms of attention to fabricate, 
reproduce, diversify and segment the needs of consumers (MS 24; WMLWL 79-134). The 
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financialization of the economy based on the development of public and private debt has created a 
speculative economy that is based on the frenetic satisfaction of drives and on short-term thinking. 
As Stiegler notes in his lectures on the proletarianization of sensibility, even (or especially) in the 
art world, it is no longer a matter of taste and judgment: speculating on the art market has become 
the rule. Hyperconsumption ultimately leads to a destruction (consummation) of all objects and 
relations, rather than to the creation of objects of desire through libidinal and financial 
investments. It is in this context that the power of the notion of proletarianization aims at 
providing alternative to workers’ struggles and demands. 
 In États de choc [States of Shock], Stiegler extends his argument about generalized 
proletarianization with the controversial claim that “systemic stupidity” is the central feature of 
our contemporary times.xxv While proletarianization is minimally defined by the loss of 
knowledge (this knowledge can be lost over generations, yet it is increasingly experienced during 
a single life time), stupidity is the pharmacological condition of all knowledge. Stiegler’s analysis 
of stupidity is based on the already mentioned Adorno and Horkheimer, but most centrally on 
Deleuze’s commentary of Nietzsche’s saying that the task of philosophy is to harm stupidity.xxvi 
For Deleuze, stupidity should not be confused with errors, it is not the negation or the destruction 
of thought but “a base way of thinking,”xxvii hence the relation between knowledge/thinking and 
stupidity is not oppositional but one of process or continuum. This analysis of stupidity is then 
read through the prism of Stiegler’s interpretation of the myth of Epimetheus and Prometheus, 
developed in the first volume of the Technics and Time series.xxviii The problem here, related to my 
discussion of the difference between alienation and proletarianization earlier on, is the risk of 
conflating proletarianization with stupidity, and in this way de-historicizing specific cases of 
proletarianization. The true originality of Stiegler’s argument about proletarianization is to allow 
for a new image of the proletariat, which is not reducible to the working class but encompasses 
everyone. This new image of the proletariat gives a potentiality to everyone and does not simply 
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assign to a certain group the heavy burden of leading the emancipatory process. Everyone is an 
amateur, that is a curator, an artist, a philosopher or a critic potentially, but also: no one escapes 
the conditions of stupidity and proletarianization. However, this generalization that Stiegler adopts 
also muddles the concept itself.  
 There is a tendency or a temptation in Stiegler’s work in generalizing proletarianization to 
too many instances, in raising the notion of proletarianization as a universal category. This is 
particularly evident when he refers to Plato as “the first thinker of proletarianization.”xxixThe 
specific form of proletarianization that Plato diagnosed in Phaedrus regarding writing informs a 
general theory of proletarianization, but one cannot but wonder if all processes of 
proletarianization, from 5 BC until today in 2014, can really be equated or be reduced to a single 
symptom. Specific technical objects and systems operate different forms of attention and care to 
which correspond specific and incommensurable instances of disindividuation and 
proletarianization. For instance, the case of forgetting the spelling of words because of the use of 
word processors when writing, create problems that cannot be compared with Alan Greenspan’s 
avowal of his loss of knowledge in the workings of the financial economy (NCPE 47). The 
obvious disadvantage of this generalization is that it potentially discourages action if too many 
things are going wrong. There is thus a need for more specific, spatio-temporally situated 
diagnoses. 
 There are different instances of proletarianization that are produced but these cannot be 
confused with stupidity as a transcendental structure of thought (as Deleuze defines it). On the 
contrary, proletarianization needs to be analyzed historically, in relation to the stages of 
grammatization, instead of raising it as an eternal condition that has existed since Plato. Stiegler is 
right to argue that Plato (and Socrates) condemn some forms of writing in Phaedrus since this 
process of exteriorizing one’s memory implies a forgetting and a first discussion of the loss of 
knowledge. However, his argument is most powerful when it diagnoses new forms of 
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proletarianization that Plato could not have envisaged, when it calls for contemporary empirical 
studies in anthropology, sociology and political science. 
 
Taking care of capitalism? 
 
Stiegler’s position on capitalism and the role of the state is founded on his project of conducting a 
general organology, to study the relations and the transductive relations between biological, 
technical and social organs.xxx For Stiegler, radical politics should be focused on individuating 
with the present capitalist organization, since a brutal interruption of capitalism as a social 
organization could be more detrimental to these other organs than the current situation: 
 
Capitalism must go to the end of its process, and we remain utterly ignorant about the way 
this will turn out. On the other hand, we can describe this process and what, in it, threatens 
to brutally interrupt it. This process is the expression of becoming insofar as it is always 
duplicitous, that is, tragic – and what I here call combat is less the class struggle than it is the 
struggle between tendencies. (DD1 57) 
 
Stiegler wants to save becoming and individuation from the double tendency of the current form 
of capitalism to hypersynchronize or hyperdiachronize (PA 105-106). The hypersynchronization is 
organized through television and advertisement, producing on an industrial scale similar behaviors 
and modes of living (the same fast-foods, the same television programs or music, the same 
working hours, the same teaching curricula), opposing all forms of diachrony or differences. 
Hyperdiachronization is the speculation of singularities to oppose all forms of synchrony, usually 
by creating intimate societies and associations (this is especially valid for the arts, but the principle 
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can be extended to all forms of work), whose very principle of existence rests on an immunization 
and an exclusion of others leading to pathologies such as anomy (a-nomos) or scapegoating 
(pharmakos). The Internet permits these hyperdiachronic groups to develop and emerge in 
unprecedented ways, and they are speculative and have self-referential practices, often having no 
reference to reality. Traders speculating all day long on financial markets can also be said to foster 
a tendency of hyperdiachronization; this is why the punk slogan “no future” has paradoxically 
been taken seriously by bankers and has been implemented.xxxi 
 In États de choc, Stiegler demonstrates the limits of poststructuralism and its paradoxical 
complicity with the neoliberalization of society: it called for resistance without proposing 
alternatives. French speculative philosophy allowed for the development of the speculative 
economy. His philosophical project is to propose a new model and enunciate its axioms, against a 
certain melancholic left that has resigned into communist nostalgia or Marxist idealism. 
Hyperdiachrony and hypersychrony are overcome in Stiegler’s project by laying out how a new 
industrial model, organized by a new public power, should take place. In investing massively, this 
new public power should aim to explore and redefine the role of new technologies and their 
possibilities in the social, elaborating therapeutic practices to (constantly) fight the toxicity of the 
pharmakon and liberate new processes of individuation and transindividuation. His 
“pharmacology of capitalism” requires first an analysis of the symptoms not of society but of the 
flows and processes of psycho-collective individuations. This is one of the distinctive aspects of 
his reading of capitalism that he shares with Simondon as well as Deleuze and Guattari: Stiegler 
does not focus on national economies but on the flows and processes that individuals as psycho-
collective individuals create. These psycho-collective individuations are in turn constituted and 
conditioned by technical tools and these tools also individuate, by changing their functions 
through new assemblages. Stiegler understands capitalism as the global configuration of these 
assemblages through capitalism’s retentional circuits. 
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 By turning trust and credit into objects of possible calculation, the (hyper)industrialists 
have participated in the liquidation of “belief as experience of the indeterminacy of the future” 
(DD1 16): 
 
It is not a matter of opposing the capitalist process but, on the contrary, of enabling it to see 
out its term, that is, of avoiding its self-destruction, and hence permitting its transformation, 
and perhaps thereby engendering, some day, a wholly other organization of individuation. 
(DD1 40-41, translation modified) 
 
For Stiegler, we do not know the end of capitalism because we only live in an associated milieu 
and cannot see past our current organization of individuation. More importantly even, this 
associated milieu has become dissociated, and singularities that “bear witness” to the 
indeterminacy of the future have been endangered when they should have been protected. There 
can be no evolution or revolution of capitalism without these singularities and the therapeutic 
struggles to “take care of the new commerce” (NCPE 50).xxxii Therefore Stiegler’s question can be 
formulated this way: how can we imagine what post-capitalism could look like if we cannot even 
see beyond the short-term satisfaction of drives? He denounces certain forms of anti-capitalism as 
being oppositional and therefore idealist, while he argues that we need to cultivate a compositional 
politics that would allow for tendencies and singularities to be articulated and produce a new 
dynamism: “combating a tendency within a process means, first of all, thinking this process as the 
articulating of a dual [double] tendency, which is what makes it dynamic” (DD1 37).xxxiii It is not a 
matter of opposing anti-capitalism as such, but to re-constitute alternatives by a dynamic 
composition that will allow for the individuation, and perhaps the transfiguration, of capitalism 
itself. He writes, “the belief that the capitalist process needs is at its core an-economic” (DD1 46). 
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This “an-economic” is the domain of life that cannot be reduced to basic necessities: subsistence. 
However, the problem raised here by Stiegler’s project of deproletarianization is its compatibility 
with the existing form of capitalism. Stiegler hesitates on this question, especially since it is 
related to copyright laws and the problem of access – I will return to this later. 
 However, Stiegler’s position on capitalism derives from his philosophical project of 
general organology. General organology is the larger project in which pharmacology (together 
with critique) functions as the methodological device to diagnose the toxicity and the curability of 
the pharmaka.xxxiv General organology is always already political since it proposes to rethink the 
relations between biological organs, technical organs and social organization and their co-
individuation in the socius. General organology draws from the original practice of organology in 
musicology, which is the study of the history of musical instruments, their practices and their 
social roles in all civilizations and historical periods. Yet general organology is not limited to the 
study of musical instruments but takes into account all technical instruments and their effects on 
biological and social organs. The Internet is today the most complex pharmakon due to the 
increasing part that it takes in our life (especially in the last six or seven years, with smartphones 
and tablets) and it should be the subject of a pharmacology that maps out the short-circuits it 
creates as well as the long circuits of transindividuation it produces in its assemblages with other 
pharmaka. General organology in this sense is a politics of “protentions,”xxxv projecting new 
assemblages and practices for transindividuations to come.  
 All technical tools for Stiegler are supports of memory and spirit, hence his expression 
“technology of spirit.” If technical tools indeed bear spirit (bear both the noetic and the spiritual, 
as in esprit in French and Geist in German), a general organology diagnoses the way these 
technical tools function with biological and social organs, electing and prescribing the 
assemblages that produce long (even infinitely long) processes of transindividuation. In his work, 
Simondon increasingly conceded an agency to technical objects; for Stiegler, this agent functions 
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due to the spirit and thoughts that these objects bear. Technical tools do not have only one role or 
one function but can be used in a multiplicity of ways. Conferring one role to a designated 
technical object is to fall back to metaphysics. The general organology on the contrary 
deconstructs the metaphysics of technical objects, accounting for the polyphony of practices that 
are inscribed within the assemblages of organs. The project of general organology diagnoses, 
presents and produces the protentions that are contained in the stages of grammatization. In this 
sense, we can say that it is always already an alter-grammatization, since it attempts to alter-
grammatize our existences with singularities, or with what Stiegler refers to as “consistences.” 
 
 
Protentional politics and the question of “tertiary protentions” 
 
Before analyzing some of Stiegler’s propositions for a deproletarianization, it is crucial to 
envisage deproletarianization as a politics of protention, in the same way Stiegler refers to other 
politics of protention in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: 
 
What took place during the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was the 
organization of the capitalist “protentionalization” of the world, which consisted firstly in 
the disenchantment of the legitimating powers and the secularization of beliefs: not in their 
destruction, but in their transformation into calculable beliefs, including through the 
harnessing of scientific beliefs by the production apparatus in order to devise ways of 
transforming matter, nature, technique, human beings, and behavior. This transformation of 
belief was able to accomplish enormous gains in production throughout the nineteenth 
century, enabling new forms of membership and social cohesion within the social project, 
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carried out by the bourgeoisie through the development of schools, through the engagement 
it made possible with national history, etc. 
 In the twentieth century, the mobilization of libidinal energies took place through the 
capturing and harnessing of protentions via channeling of attention. It was thus a matter of 
elaborating [tendre] an industrial protention... and thus of overcoming the contradiction in 
which consists in the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. 
 In the course of the recent crisis, this protentional system collapsed, after having run out of 
control as it was driven toward an ever-more extreme short-termism, reaching the limit of its 
self-annihilation. (NCPE 67-69, emphasis in the original, translation modified) 
 
Deproletarianization requires conducting a general organology, but this general organology has to 
diagnose the protentions in the co-individuations of biological, technical and social organs, that is, 
the organizations of the powers “to project” and to “expect.”xxxvi  
 Protentional politics is the capacity to “throw” thoughts, it is a certain becoming-projectile 
of politics by placing desire at its heart. The question of protention differs from 
deproletarianization. While deproletarianization is the conquest of knowledge, protention is 
construction of the future through primary, secondary and tertiary mediums. The relation between 
retentions and protentions is not that of a simple correspondence. It is, rather, analogic or 
reticulary. It is, indeed, through an ecology of spirit (after Bateson), that relations between 
primary, secondary and tertiary retentions and primary, secondary and tertiary protentions can be 
established. However, the question of these protentions remains underdeveloped in Stiegler’s 
work.  
 Collective secondary protentions are defined as “a process that constitutes horizons of 
expectation” (DD1 112) and are determined in the same way as singular primary protentions by 
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tertiary retentions (that are technical objects).xxxvii To my knowledge, Stiegler hardly ever 
mentions “tertiary protentions.” The only example of tertiary retention that he provides is money 
(as coins or banknotes).xxxviii This is surprising since, following Stiegler, tertiary protentions will 
be the materialization of attention and expectations, for he often defines protentions as “objects of 
desire” (PFN 29). The dollar bill famously bears the inscription “In God we trust,” recalling 
Benjamin Franklin’s sermon that “time is money” and “credit is money” (DD1 66-67). This trust 
inscribed on the banknote is the transformation of belief into a calculable trust that is credit. 
According to Stiegler, this process has led with hyperconsumption to the “destruction of belief 
through the calculation of trust” and to the exhaustion of trust and credit (what he calls 
“discredit”), bringing capitalism on the verge of self-destruction (DD1 71, see also DD1 85-89).  
 But one could think of many more objects of desire than money. For instance, when 
Fredric Jameson argues in Archaeologies of Utopia that utopias are desires “with a textual 
existence in the present,” this is compatible with Stiegler’s notions of tertiary retention, and the 
speculative and the mysterious (or even mystagogic) notion of tertiary protention.xxxix 
Traditionally, utopias are first and foremost texts that have a materiality – they are archives of 
desires – and intend to produce universal expectations as well as material ones (constituting a 
political party, quitting one’s job, etc.). This is probably not the case for other literary genres. 
While secondary protentions are shared collectively, tertiary retentions – and through them certain 
mysterious tertiary protentions – overdetermine both primary (psychic) and secondary (collective) 
protentions. We could possibly think of other forms of tertiary protentions, such as constitutions or 
even religious books (or objects); Jameson refers to Rousseau’s projects of constitution-writing as 
utopias.. Constitutions construct the spirit of the laws as well as envisages foreseeable historical 
events (sometimes to prevent them) (Jameson AF 18, 36). Hannah Arendt comments on Woodrow 
Wilson, who criticized Americans for their “blind and undiscriminating” worship of the US 
Constitution, and finds within this worship a positivity and a strength: 
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Perhaps the political genius of the American people… consisted precisely in this blindness, 
or, to put it another way, consisted in the extraordinary capacity to look upon yesterday with 
the eyes of centuries to come.xl 
Arendt is clear that what we usually consider to be a “written document,” for the American 
people, the US Constitution is “the remembrance of the event itself – a people deliberately 
founding a new body politic,” (Arendt OR 204) but this can be extended to the hopes and the 
promises that this “worshiped” text contains for the American people. This speculative excursion 
on the possible forms tertiary protention would probably have to turn to objects that support cults 
and faiths, and would have to be historically and anthropologically studied, since they are specific 
to the forms of belief of the community or the social organization.xli As noted earlier, these 
examples of tertiary protentions overdetermine primary and secondary protentions, in the same 
way, tertiary retentions support both primary and secondary retentions for Stiegler. 
 From this short section on protentions and retentions, it is clear why Stiegler’s affirmative 
politics – economy of contribution and the processes of deproletarianizationxlii – is a project of 
taking control of retentional and protentional apparatuses or dispositifs. This can be accomplished 
through an ideology critique, that is a critique of the ways in which apparatuses are used: 
 
An ideology has less to do with disseminating [diffuser] or infusing [infuser] ideas than to 
take control of retentional and protentional apparatuses [dispositifs] of technologies of 
transindividuation – and at the time of Mussolini, then Hitler, these technologies are radio 
and cinema (PFN 216). 
 
A new critique of ideology needs to not only know the functioning networks of information 
technology but also take control of them, and participate in their making and unmaking, to 
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individuate the most sophisticated technical tools that make the associated milieu. “What I cannot 
build, I cannot understand,” the physician Richard Feynman writes.xliii However, this does not 
mean that revolutionaries should all become computer scientists or technical engineers – in the 
same way that in the 1930s-1960s the Marxist revolution did not need intellectuals to become 
factory workers, and therefore proletarianized. But there should be a renewed dialogue or even 
relations between philosophy and technics: technics should inform philosophy, and vice-versa. 
Following Simondon and others, his project is techno-logical: creating a new logos (rationality, or 
reason) of techne (both art and science). 
 
 
Deproletarianization, economy of contribution and the rise of the amateur 
 
“A revolutionary process is taking place. It is both technological and economic, but not yet 
political” (EC 230). The proletarianization of decision-making is for Stiegler responsible for the 
disinvestment of the state and the rise of public debt. Public debts are not the cause of the 
weakening and the withering of the state but their symptoms. Dogmatic Marxists resigned in the 
fight against proletarianization, since for them, communism is the dictatorship of the proletariat. 
Hence, the deproletarianization of the proletariat is not an issue for Marxists: they affirm that 
“there is nothing beyond proletarianization” (EC 223).xliv They are not interested in the production 
of new knowledges. The new digital technologies have allowed for new forms of political 
movements and rallies (the Occupy movement, the Arab spring) but the new territorialization with 
the digital reticularity has led to the destruction of the long-term temporality specific to politics 
and the media. Significant events or movements can last a very short period (a day or even a few 
hours) before being erased from the collective consciousness by a new video from a politician or 
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the publication new opinion poll, etc. In this sense, deproletarianization has to produce new 
knowledges when the time of the media has been entirely reconfigured.xlv 
 André Gorz and Maurizio Lazzarato are the main two sources of inspiration for Stiegler to 
develop his alternative politics of deproletarianization: the “economy of contribution.” Gorz has 
developed an original philosophy of work that considers the ontological distinction between work 
and employment: employment is a rationalized version of work, or, in Stieglerian terms, 
employment blocks the processes of individuation and is reduced to a proletarianized form of 
work. Yet employment and work should not be opposed. By referring to Lazzarato and his study 
of the model of remuneration of artists in France (under the regime of intermittents du spectacle) 
Stiegler understands that the main problem is the tendency in recent public policies to increase the 
part taken by employment in one’s life, and to forget about other forms of work.xlvi Employment is 
a set of rational tasks that are organized in a “megamachine,” and individuals are reduced to being 
servants to this megamachine with which they do not agree and in which they do not believe. As 
Stiegler often acknowledges, Gorz argued in The Immaterial that open source softwares have the 
potential to free work from employment constraints, since they have a high production cost (in 
terms of labor) but they can also be reproduced almost unlimitedly at a negligible cost (Gorz I 44). 
The circulation of these softwares and the continuous possibility of transformation that they 
permit lay the foundations for Stiegler’s and his political organization Ars Industrialis’s economy 
of contribution. The mode of production and circulation of free softwares are paradigmatic for 
Gorz and Stiegler of the transformation of capitalism and the possibilities to come. In theoretical 
terms, this allows us to take seriously “the question of work time outside of employment” (NCPE 
22, emphasis removed). 
 Gorz raises the problem in terms of applied knowledges or skills (connaissances) and 
knowledge (savoir) and also sees the process of proletarianization, but he expresses it in different 
terms: “the great majority has the knowledge [connaît] of more and more things but knows [sait] 
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and understands [comprend] less and less” (Gorz I 111). The problem with the so-called 
“knowledge economy,” according to Gorz, is that we are led to believe that all forms of 
knowledge are formalizable or codifiable. The proximity of Gorz’s theses on knowledge and 
Stiegler’s account of proletarianization is striking.  
 Yet there are also disagreements between Stiegler and Gorz. The first one is that Gorz 
thinks of the new forms of production as “immaterial,” whereas Stiegler insists they are 
“hypermaterial.” To claim that new technologies (softwares or the internet) operate at the 
immaterial level is to retreat into idealism and to dismiss the material inscription of information 
and energy. The notion of hypermaterial on the other hand allows us to think the increasing 
industrialization and materialization of life. The second disagreement, which is probably more 
fundamental, concerns the end of capitalism and the mutation to new forms of post-capitalist 
social relations.xlvii Stiegler shares Gorz’s understanding of non-rationalized work as producing 
value when he chooses to reinstate the figure of the amateur, the revolutionary figure par 
excellence. He also agrees with Gorz’s propositions for a guaranteed basic income (a form of 
“negative income tax”). The death of capitalism for Gorz is not the project of collectivizing all 
properties (including intellectual property) but the liberation from employment, when non-
rationalized forms of work can become once again an integral part of one’s life: 
 
The task for the left, if the left can continue to exist, is to transform this liberation of time 
into a new freedom, and into new rights: the right for everyone to earn one’s life by 
working, but by working less and less, better and better, while receiving one’s own share of 
the socially produced wealth. The right to also work non-continuously or intermittently 
without losing the full revenue during the intermittences – in order to open new spaces for 
activities without an economic goal and to recognize a dignity and an inherent value for 
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individuals as well as for society as a whole, to activities that do not hold remuneration as 
the only goal.xlviii 
 
What is surprising in Stiegler’s undecidability – he admits “not [being] completely clear on” on 
open softwares and “of not knowing” whether capitalism will be replaced by socialismxlix– is the 
incompatibility of his stated rejection of Gorz and Lazzarato’s political positions while adhering to 
their economic analyses to feed his arguments about a contributive economy. A “new form of 
value” should be cultivated that comes from a work outside the rationalised form of employment. 
Stiegler recognises the imperative to take care of this new form value, which he calls “spirit 
value.”l For him, the taking care of new modes of transindividuation happens in this new form of 
value insofar as it is not reducible to the exchange-value or even to the use-value. The excess of 
consumption has liquidated institutions and belief in general, creating economies based on 
suspicion and discredit, rather than care and love. Stiegler reinstates the figure of the amateur to 
imagine what forms this contributive work could take (or Gorz’s “socially produced wealth”).  
 Although not named as such, the practice of amateurs was already conceptualized in certain 
Autonomia writings, or even in Félix Guattari’s notion of the postmedia.li Free radios, for 
instance, first operated with pirate means and before slowly prospering within a legal framework, 
until they became, a few years later, increasingly standardized and colonized by advertisements. 
In Mystagogies, Stiegler develops this notion of the amateur by going back to its Latin etymology: 
amator means the lover, the person who loves.lii The history of amateurs and their place in the 
history of grammatization is evocative of their potential, but also of the hurdles and challenges 
that await them. In early eighteenth-century France, the term “amateur” referred to the aristocratic 
figure who advised artists. The amateur was also a mediator, a writer and a curator. “Honorary 
amateur” was a status for those lovers of art who had developed an acute knowledge and 
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appreciation of art. Diderot criticized them for favoring pleasure over instruction, taste over 
judgement. With the French revolution, the term took on an unflattering and discrediting meaning: 
“during the Revolution, the amateur is driven away by the aristocratic values which he last 
incarnated.”liii The digital age allowed for the formation of “taste communities” today what small 
and privileged urban environments such as Paris or Vienna have made possible in the last two 
centuries.liv For Stiegler, the amateur is a revolutionary agent, since in the age of generalized 
proletarianization and surplus population, and far from representing the public at large or the 
consumer in the “sharing economy,” the amateur is an active participant in social circles, a 
producer of new practices, new discourses and artefacts. Although the eighteen-century amateurs 
were used by the monarchic regime, by creating a wealth of knowledges (erudite treatises, 
taxonomies, etc.) they were also active participants in the social life of art. As in the exemplary 
case of Claude-Henri Watelet’s Rymbranesques, whose copies of Rembrandt’s paintings 
contributed in the reassessment of Rembrandt in the artistic canon one century after the death of 
the Dutch painter, amateurs learned about paintings and other artworks by copying, not to imitate 
or falsify the traits but on the contrary to learn with them and to understand how the artistic 
gesture and particular works of art “function” (as the verb œuvrer): “in the culture of amateurs, 
knowledge was a praxis, not a theory.”lv In reinstating this term, Stiegler wants to move away 
from the derogatory meaning of the terms “amateur” (especially when referred to as 
“amateurism”), as being opposed to “professional.” For after all, in the digital age, the amateur is 
the noble figure who contributes to the production and the prosperity of singularities against the 
atrophy and the entropy generated by the capitalist system. 
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Marx avec Simondon,” in Cahiers Simondon, No. 5, Jean-Hugues Barthélémy ed. (Paris: 
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vii Simondon quoted in Pascal Chabot, La Philosophie de Simondon (Paris: Vrin, 2003), 50.	  
viii Bernard Stiegler, Philosopher par accident (Paris: Galilée, 2004), 90-91. Hereafter, this work is 
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ix Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, trans. Martin 
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does not refer to the category of the proletariat in his book, apart from arguing that this category 
should be defined in global rather than national terms (61), confirms the problem that I outlined 
about the lack of dialogue between the tradition studying alienation on the one hand, and 
proletarianization on the other. 
xii Victor Petit, “Grammatisation” in Bernard Stiegler, Pharmacologie du Front national (Paris: 
Flammarion, 2013), 400-1. Hereafter, this work is cited parenthetically as PFN. 
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parenthetically as MS. 
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trans. Daniel Ross and Suzanne Arnold (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011), 35, translation modified. 
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xvii We are astonished at John Hutnyk’s Marxist deterministic proposition that entirely 
misinterprets Stiegler’s precise notion of proletarianization: “There is the possibility of going 
further here, to proletarianize it all, and taking up Marx’s nuanced consideration of 
proletarianization in a wider sense, suggesting that what is called incivility and delinquency are 
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would reduce all of life to marketing controls…. a Marxist interpretation of the present crisis 
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should not stop with a diagnosis of ruin. The recognition and incivility are not enough, and we 
may need rather more delinquents, and considerable civil unrest, before a revolutionary call to 
attention gains ground.” Paradoxically, we see that Hutnyk’s Marxism falls back to the status quo 
and the same social-democrat policies of prescribing more consumption and proletarianization. He 
also points out how Stiegler does not see the possible “multiple and non-linear time” that an 
exposure to television produces and the deep attention it can solicit, he asks “why not grant the 
possibility that these forms have a role in progressive political transformation as well?” (149). But 
this is precisely what Stiegler does and has been doing in his philosophical project and outside the 
walls of philosophy since the 1980s! See John Hutnyk, “Proletarianisation”, new formations, 77, 
127-149.  
xviii On hyperconsumption as being addictive and toxic, see Bernard Stiegler, Mécréance et 
Discrédit, 2: Les sociétés incontrôlables d'individus désaffectés (Paris: Galilée, 2006), 122-23. 
xix Bernard Stiegler, What Makes Life Worth Living: On Pharmacology, trans. Daniel Ross 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), 53. Hereafter, this work is cited parenthetically as WMLWL. 
xx Gerald Moore, “Adapt and Smile or Die! Stiegler Among the Darwinists,” in Christina Howells 
and Gerald Moore (eds.), Stiegler and Technics (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 
especially 24-33. 
xxi Guy Debord, The Society of Spectacle, trans. D. Nicholson-Smith (New York: Zone Books, 
1995), originally published in 1967, and Jean Baudrillard, The Consumer Society: Myths and 
Structures, trans. C. Turner (London: Sage, 1998), originally published in 1970. 
xxii Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment (London: Verso, 1997), 
126-7; see Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time 3: The Time of Cinema, trans. Stephen Barker 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 35-40. 
xxiii DD1 63, 87; Bernard Stiegler, La télécratie contre démocratie (Paris: Flammarion, 2006), 
236-7. 
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xxiv This is argued in Bernard Stiegler, Taking Care. Of Youth and Generations, trans. Stephen 
Barker (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010). 
xxv This notion of “systemic stupidity” was briefly introduced in WMLWL 22-3, 131. 
xxvi Deleuze always referred to this as the mission of philosophy. In his Abécédaire (filmed in 
1988-9), he notes “People pretend that philosophy is after all only good for after dinner 
conversations, but if philosophy did not exist, we cannot imagine the level of stupidity…. The 
same goes if there were no art, we cannot imagine the vulgarity of people. The world would not be 
what it presently is if there were no art, people would not care anymore [les gens ne se tiendraient 
plus].” Gilles Deleuze with Claire Parnet, “R as Resistance,” in Pierre-André Boutang, Abécédaire 
de Gilles Deleuze, (Éditions Montparnasse, 2004). 
xxvii Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2006), 105. 
xxviii See Chapter 10 “Epimetheus’s Stupidity,” in PFN 218-239. 
xxix Stiegler, “Anamnesis and Hypomnesis: Plato as the first thinker of proletarianisation,” 
arsindustrialis.org/anamnesis-and-hypomnesis (last accessed 18th November 2013); Bernard 
Stiegler, For A New Critique of Political Economy, trans. Daniel Ross (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2010), 29-36. He writes, “what Socrates describes in Phaedrus, namely that the exteriorization of 
memory is a loss of memory and knowledge, has today become our everyday experience in all 
aspects of our existence, and more and more often, in the feeling of our powerlessness 
[impuissance]” (29, translation modified). Hereafter, this work is cited parenthetically as NCPE. 
xxx The notion of transductive relations comes from Simondon: a relationship which constitutes the 
elements themselves, they could not exist without each other. In the case of Stiegler, the technical 
object (the “what”) is co-constitutive of the subject (the “who”): “the what invents the who as 
much as it is invented by it.” Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, vol. 1: The Fault of 
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Epimetheus, trans. Richard Beardsworth and George Collins (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1998), 177. 
xxxi Franco “Bifo” Berardi, The Uprising: On Poetry and Finance (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 
2012). In this text, Franco “Bifo” Berardi makes the interesting parallel between poetry and 
finance, for the experimental forms of poetry and writing, that the twentieth century has 
witnessed, anticipated the dereferentialization of speculative economy: 
 
The experience of French and Russian symbolism broke the referential-denotative link 
between the word and the world… This magic of post-referential language anticipated the 
general process of dereferentialization that occurred when the economy became a semio-
economy. The financialization of the capitalist economy implies a growing abstraction of 
work from its useful function, and of communication from its bodily dimension. As 
symbolism experimented with the separation of the linguistic signifier from its denotational 
and referential function, so financial capitalism, after internalizing potencies, has separated 
the monetary signifier from its function of denotation and reference to physical goods (18-
19). 
 
But Berardi also believes in the power of poetry and that it will start the process of “reactivating 
the emotional body,… social solidarity,… [and] the desiring force of enunciation” (20). This 
comparison of two forms of hyperdiachronization is very interesting because on the one hand, 
Berardi presents financial speculation as a practice that has a tendency to reduce everything to 
calculation (through the destruction of the time of decision by using robots that trade on markets 
in nanoseconds), and on the other, self-referential sentences that break from grammar and whose 
reading requires an extreme attention and reduces all things to belief (or even meditation). Both of 
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these are opposed either to belief or to calculation, but following Stiegler, “it should not be a 
matter of opposing calculation to belief” (DD1, 47, trans. modified). 
xxxii It should be noted that Stiegler makes a distinction between commerce and market from the 
volume 1 of the Disbelief and Discredit series, his argument is that the market has destroyed 
commerce. “Commerce is always an exchange of savoir-faire and savoir-vivre…. On the other 
hand, however, the consumerist market presupposes the liquidation of both savoir-faire and 
savoir-vivre” (NCPE 16). 
xxxiii See also the excellent article by Daniel Ross, “Politics and Aesthetics, or, Transformations of 
Aristotle in Bernard Stiegler,” Transformations 17 (2007) 
www.transformationsjournal.org/journal/issue_17/article_04.shtml 
xxxiv An interesting variation on pharmacology is Paolo Vignola’s project of symptomatology that 
attempts to diagnose the symptoms that erode societies: “It is only once symptoms are 
individuated and analyzed at the heart of society that it is possible for Stiegler to practice a 
pharmacology to act in a therapeutic manner on a malaise, and to eventually reverse it into a 
chance to learn, much like what happened to Epimetheus, the Titan that experienced, through his 
defaults, his own stupidity.” Paolo Vignola, “Devenir dignes du pharmakon : Entre 
symptomatologie et pharmacologie,” in B. Dillet and A. Jugnon (eds.), Technologiques. La 
Pharmacie de Bernard Stiegler (Nantes: Cécile Defaut, 2013), 414-5. 
xxxv “Protention” is defined in Edmund Husserl’s philosophy, and borrowed by Stiegler, to 
designate the capacity to project oneself and the collective toward the future, whereas “retention” 
is the action of “retaining,” that is memory. The whole of Stiegler’s philosophy is based on the 
conceptual distinction between three kinds of memory: primary retention (personal recollections), 
secondary retention (collective memory, like history or a language) and a third retention 
(technological memory, developed from Derrida’s concept of “trace”). While “retention” refers to 
the past (but a past that is not static but dynamic and therefore can individuate), “protention” 
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means here the future (projects) and the capacity to individuate these projections, and possible 
realities (expectations). It is this capacity of projection (to project oneself) in the long term that 
defines the (psycho-social) investment in the objects of desire. 
xxxvi “This is what the Greek word, elpis, means: expectation (that is, protention), at once hope and 
fear” (DD1 45). 
xxxvii Stiegler also notes that for him these collective secondary protentions are related to what he 
calls “consistences”, this notion comes from Husserl’s idealities. They make up the “pre-
individual fund” (he uses here Simondon’s vocabulary). See also DD1 92, 111-16; WMLWL 19. 
xxxviii The term “tertiary protention” is used in EC 235. It is also implied in the section “Economy 
of Protentions” in NCPE, 66-70. 
xxxix Jameson defines utopias as being not only a text but also a desire, what he calls a “Utopian 
impulse” (xiv) or a “standing reserve of personal and political energy” (7), it is both form and 
content. For Jameson, utopian writing is a practice of an “absolute formalism in which the new 
content emerges itself from the form and is a projection of it” (212), it is a window to the 
improbable projections of the future, and in this sense “form becomes content” (212). The formal 
aspects of utopia are not only reflected in the style of writing but in its projects that require a 
certain form, it is about totalized spaces, cities and buildings. “The presumption is that Utopia, 
whose business is the future, or not-being, exists only in the present, where it leads the relatively 
feeble life of desire and fantasy…. The aporia of the trace is to belong to past and present all at 
once, and thus to constitute a mixture of being and not-being quite different from the traditional 
category of Becoming and thereby mildly scandalous for analytical Reason. Utopia, which 
combines the not-yet-being of the future with a textual existence in the present is no less worthily 
of the archaeological paradoxes we are willing to grant to the trace” (xv-xvi). Fredric Jameson, 
Archaeologies of the Future (London: Verso, 2007). Hereafter, this work is cited parenthetically 
as Jameson AF. 
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xl Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (London : Penguin, 1973), 198. Hereafter, this work is cited 
parenthetically as Arendt OR.	  
xli The Bible, the Torah and the Koran, when studied as the “only book,” will be the first examples 
that come to mind, but the most significant example is probably the practices of “Guru Granth 
Sahib” in Sikhism that personify their scriptures as a living guru.	  
xlii Stiegler also uses the term “re-capacitation” in reference to Amartya Sen’s capabilities 
approach (PFN 326-344). 
xliii This quotation is an epigraph in Antonio Damasio, Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the 
Conscious Brain (New York: Random House, 2010). 
xliv I tried to show earlier that Stiegler risks to discourage all struggles against proletarianization 
when he conflates it with stupidity, making it a transcendental condition. 
xlv On these questions concerning the reconfigured time of the media, see Tom Vandeputte, “La 
Fabrique du présent : Stiegler et le temps de l’actualité,” in B. Dillet & A. Jugnon (eds.), 
Technologiques. La Pharmacie de Bernard Stiegler, 393-412. 
xlvi “The question of time spent working cannot be reduced, in other words, to the question of time 
in employment” (NCPE 51-52). See Antonella Corsani and Maurizio Lazzarato, Intermittents et 
précaires [Precarious and intermittent workers] (Paris: Éditions Amsterdam, 2008). 
xlvii Bernard Stiegler, Économie de l’hypermatériel et psychopouvoir. Entretiens avec Philippe 
Petit et Vincent Bontemps (Paris: Mille et une nuits, 2008) 127. 
xlviii André Gorz, “Pourquoi la société salariale a besoin de nouveaux valets,” Le Monde 
diplomatique, June 1990. 
xlix “I myself am not completely clear regarding what I think of the idea of ‘radical free software’, 
‘creative commons’, ‘open source’, the difference between them and their different modalities; I 
haven’t yet formed a solid view because I think that in order to have a concerted viewpoint one 
must spent a great deal of time studying carefully the organisational models and questions, which 
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are also the primary questions particularly regarding property and industrial property… [My] 
position is not that of knowing whether capitalism will be replaced by socialism, communism or 
who knows what. I think that no one could respond to that question today; a tremendous amount 
of work needs to be done theoretically and practically as well, and this work does not yet exist.” 
Bernard Stiegler, Ben Roberts, Jeremy Gilbert and Mark Hayward, “A Rational Theory of 
Miracles: on Pharmacology and “Transindividuation”, an interview with Bernard Stiegler,” new 
formations 77, 183 
l Bernard Stiegler, Ars Industrialis, Réenchanter le monde. La valeur esprit contre le populisme 
industriel (Paris: Flammarion, 2006); WMLWL 9-26. 
li In 1985, Guattari calls for a “concerted reappropriation of communication technologies and 
computers” (133), Félix Guattari, “Du postmoderne au postmédia,” Multitudes 34 (Autumn 2008), 
128- 133. 
lii Bernard Stiegler, Mystagogies. De l’art contemporain, de la littérature et du cinéma, 
forthcoming. 
liii Jean-Louis Jam (ed.), Les divertissements utiles : des amateurs au XVIIIe siècle, (Clermont-
Ferrand : Presses Universitaires Blaise Pascal, 2000), 11. 
liv Charlotte Guichard, “Taste Communities: The Rise of the Amateur in Eighteen-Century Paris,” 
Eighteenth-Century Studies, Vol. 45, No. 4, Summer 2012, 519-547. In this excellent article, 
Guichard recounts the role of the amateurs during the French monarchy, in sustaining and 
producing a French school of painting by keeping art criticism at bay. These closed societies were 
first directed by the monarchy against the rise of the artistic public sphere, and they participated in 
the production of knowledge, creating taxonomies from their taste and their choice in collecting. 
Erudition and pleasure come together in the amateur’s work and its reliance on taste (rather than 
judgment).  
lv Guichard, “Taste Communities: The Rise of the Amateur in Eighteenth-Century Paris,” 539. 
